A Privacy-Protecting Architecture for Collaborative Filtering via Forgery and Suppression of Ratings

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Outline

Introduction

- State of the Art
- An Architecture for Privacy Protection in Collaborative Filtering based Recommendation Systems
- Formulation of the Optimal Trade-Off between Privacy and Utility

Conclusions

Introduction

Information Overload

The amount of information on the Web has grown exponentially since the advent of the Internet



Collaborative Filtering

- A recommendation system is a filtering system that suggest information items that are likely to be of interest to the user
 - Recommendation systems based on collaborative filtering (CF) algorithms
 - Examples include Amazon, Digg, Movielens and Netflix



User Profiles

 Users need to communicate their preferences to the recommender in order to obtain a prediction for those items they have not yet considered



Privacy Risk

 The privacy risks perceived by users include computers "figuring things out" about them, unsolicited marketing, court subpoenas, and government surveillance [Cranor 03]



Forgery and Suppression of Ratings

- Submitting false information and refusing to give private information are strategies accepted by users concerned with their privacy [Fox 00, Hoffman 99]
- Our approach relies upon the forgery and suppression of ratings



Contribution (I)

- Our architecture protects user privacy to a certain extent
 - utility loss measured as forgery rate and suppression rate



Contribution (II)

- Mathematical formulation of the optimal trade-off among privacy, forgery rate ρ and suppression rate σ
 - Privacy as the Shannon entropy of the user's apparent profile

$$\mathcal{P}(\rho, \sigma) = \max_{\substack{r,s\\r_i \ge 0, \sum r_i = \rho\\q_i \ge s_i \ge 0, \sum s_i = \sigma}} \operatorname{H}\left(\frac{q+r-s}{1+\rho-\sigma}\right)$$

 Our proposal could be used in combination with other existing approaches

State of the Art

Privacy Protection in Recommendation Systems

- The state-of-the-art approaches may be classified according to these main strategies
 - perturbing the information provided by users [Pollat 03, 05, Agrawal 01, Kargupta 03, Huang 05],
 - using cryptographic techniques [Canny 02, Ahmad 07, Zhan 10], and
 - distributing the information collected [Miller 04, Berkovsky 07]



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[Canny 02]

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An Architecture for Privacy Protection in CF-based Recommendation Systems

Overview

- Profiling is accomplished on the basis of user ratings
- Information items are classified as known or unknown
- Users may wish to submit ratings to unknown items (forgery) and refrain from rating known items (suppression)



User Profile Model





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- [Toubiana 10, Fredrikson 11] suggest representing user profiles as histograms of absolute frequencies
- We model the profile of a user as a probability mass function (PMF)

User Profile Construction

- Our architecture requires to estimate the actual profile of a user to help them decide which items should be rated and which should not
 - Histogram based on the categories provided by the recommender
 - Categorize items by exploring web pages and using the vector space model [Salton 75]



Adversarial Model

- Passive attacker capable of crawling through the items rated by a user
- The attacker observes the apparent user profile t, a perturbed version of the actual user profile q



Privacy Measure

We measure privacy as the Shannon entropy of the user's apparent profile t

$$\mathbf{H}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} t_i \log_2 t_i$$

 Accordingly, privacy is compromised whenever the user's preferences are biased towards certain categories of interest







Block Functional

- Communication with the recommender
- Retrieve information about the items explore by the user





Description - Starting at the beginning, the book explores how JavaScript originated and evolved into what it is today. A detailed discussion of the components that make up a JavaScript implementation follows, with specific focus on standards such as ECMAScript and the Document Object Model (DOM).

Category - books \ computers & internet \ web development Average Customer Review 4.5/5

Description - Stephen Hawking, one of the most brilliant theoretical physicists in history, wrote the modern classic A Brief History of Time to help nonscientists understand the questions being asked by scientists today.

Category - books \ science Average Customer Review 4/5



Description - Written by soccer great and championship Stanford coach Bobby Clark, this book tells you how, starting at point zero, an uninitiated coach can meld kids into a team and help them enjoy one of the most rewarding experiences of their youth.

Category - books \ sports \ coaching \ soccer Average Customer Review 4.5/5



Description - You've made it! Your baby has turned one! Now the real fun begins. From temper tantrums to toilet training, raising a toddler brings its own set of challenges and questions — and Toddler 411 has the answers.

Category - books \ parenting & families \ parenting Average Customer Review 3/5













Formulation of the Optimal Trade-Off between Privacy and Utility

Trade-Off between Privacy and Utility

- \blacksquare The degradation in the accuracy of predictions is measured as σ and ρ
- We model items as r.v.'s taking on values in a common finite alphabet of n categories
- We define
 - q as the actual user profile
 - $\rho \in [0,1)$ as the forgery rate
 - $\sigma \in [0,1)$ as the suppression rate
- Accordingly, the user's apparent profile is defined as

$$\frac{q+r-s}{1+\rho-\sigma}$$

•
$$r = (r_1, \dots, r_n), r_i \ge 0, \sum r_i = \rho$$

• $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n), q_i \ge s_i \ge 0, \sum s_i = \sigma$

Trade-Off between Privacy and Utility

- Privacy is measured as the Shannon entropy of the user's apparent profile
- The privacy-forgery-suppression function

$$\mathcal{P}(\rho, \sigma) = \max_{\substack{r,s\\r_i \ge 0, \sum r_i = \rho\\q_i \ge s_i \ge 0, \sum s_i = \sigma}} \operatorname{H}\left(\frac{q+r-s}{1+\rho-\sigma}\right)$$

 This formulation specifies the key functional block of our architecture, namely the 'Forgery and Suppression Generator'

Conclusions

Conclusions

- The forgery and suppression of ratings arise as two simple mechanisms in terms of infrastructure,
 - but it comes at the cost of a loss in utility, namely the degradation in the accuracy of the predictions
- We propose an architecture that implements these two mechanisms in those CF-based recommendation systems that profile users exclusively from their ratings
 - The centerpiece of our approach is a module responsible for computing the tuples of forgery *r* and suppression *s*
 - This information is used to warn the user when their privacy is being compromised
 - It is up to the user to decide whether to forge or eliminate a rating
- We present a formulation of the optimal trade-off among privacy, forgery rate and suppression rate

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