

Privacy Challenges in RFID

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SUMMARY

- Background about RFID
- Privacy: Information Leakage
- Privacy: Malicious Traceability
- Is Privacy a Research Challenge?

BACKGROUND ABOUT RFID


- Background about RFID
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- Privacy: Malicious Traceability
- Is Privacy a Research Challenge?

- **Radio Frequency IDentification** (RFID) consists in remotely retrieving datas (identifier and potentially additional datas) using devices called RFID tags.
- An RFID tag contain a **microcircuit** (chip) and an **antenna** to enable it to receive and respond to radio-frequency queries from an **RFID reader/writer**.
- An RFID tag can be a **low-capability device** e.g. for pet identification, but also a **powerful contactless smartcard** e.g. for biometric passports.



Credit: Gildas Avoine

Architecture



■ Supply chain tracking.

- Track boxes, palettes, etc.



www.aeroid.co.uk

■ Libraries.

- Improve book borrowing and inventories.



www.rfid-library.com

■ Pet identification.

- Replace tattoos by electronic ones.
- ISO11784, ISO11785.



www.flickr.com

■ Localisation.

- Children in amusement parks, Elderly people.
- Counting cattle.



www.safetzone.com

- **Building access control.**
 - Eg. UCL, MIT.
- **Automobile ignition key.**
 - Eg. TI DST, Keeloq.
- **Public transportation.**
 - Eg. Brussels, Boston, Paris, ..., Thalys.
- **Payment.**
 - Eg. Visa, Baja Beach Club.
- **Electronic documents.**
 - Eg. ePassports.
- **Loyalty cards.**



Credit: G. Avoine



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www.carthiefstoppers.com



www.brusselnieuws.be




blogs.e-rockford.com



www.bajabeach.es

Tag Characteristics



- Low capabilities.
- Wireless.
- Ubiquity.
- Fast authentication.

■ Security.

- Impersonation.
- Denial of service.

■ Privacy.

- Information leakage.
- Malicious traceability.

Research fields about RFID Privacy

<http://www.avoine.net/rfid/>

- Privacy models.
- Untraceable (lightweight) protocols.
- Untraceable (scalable) protocols.
- Counterfeiting.
- Grouping Proof.
- Ownership transfer.
- Applications: ePassport, pacemakers, etc.




PRIVACY: INFORMATION LEAKAGE

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Importance of Avoiding Traceability

Other Technologies

- Differences between **RFID** and the other technologies eg. **video**, **credit cards**, **GSM**, **Bluetooth**.
 - Tags cannot be switched-off.
 - Passive tags answer without the agreement of their bearers.
 - Easy to analyze the logs of the readers.
 - Increasing of the communication range.
 - Tags can be almost invisible.



- Even if you do not think that privacy is important, some people think so and they are rather influential (CASPIAN, FoeBud,...).



- Member States should ensure that operators (...) conduct an assessment of the implications of the application implementation for the **protection of personal data and privacy**, including whether the application could be used to **monitor an individual**.
- Because of its potential to be both ubiquitous and practically invisible, particular attention to privacy and data protection issues is required in the deployment of RFID. Consequently, **privacy and information security features should be built into RFID applications before their widespread use (principle of security and privacy by design)**.

[Viviane Reding, EC Recommendation, 12.5.2009]

Importance of Avoiding Traceability

Anne Cavioukan

- “Privacy and Security must be **built in from the outset**, at the design Stage”.

[Privacy Guidelines for RFID Information Systems, 2006, Anne Cavioukan, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario]

Importance of Avoiding Traceability

Palliative Solutions

- Kill-command (Eg.: EPC Gen 2 requires a 32-bit kill command.)
- Faraday cages.
- Blocker tags.
- Bill of Rights.
- Removable antenna.
 - US Patent 7283035 - RF data communications device with selectively removable antenna portion and method.
- Tag must be pressed (SmartCode Corp.).



www.idstronghold.com

- Information **meaningful by itself**.
- Information **meaningful with the database**.

Information Meaningful by Itself

Typical Examples

- Information leakage appears when the data sent by the tag **reveals information intrinsic** to the marked object or the holder of the object.
 - Tagged books in **libraries**.
 - Tagged **pharmaceutical** products, as advocated by the US. Food and Drug Administration.
 - **E-documents** (passports, ID cards, etc.).
 - Loyalty cards, **Public transportation passes**.

Information Meaningful by Itself

Ari Juels's Famous Picture



Credit: Ari Juels


Information Meaningful by Itself

Public Transportation: MOBIB Card in Brussels

- **MOBIB** card (RFID) launched in **Brussels** in 2008.
- Before getting in a subway, bus or tram, customers are required to show up their MOBIB card in front of a validator.
- MOBIB is **Calypso** technology.
- MOBIB cards are rather **powerful** RFID tags that embed cryptographic mechanisms to avoid impersonation or cloning.
- Personal data are stored **in the clear** in the card: name, birthdate, zipcode.
- Information about 3 last validations: date, time, bus line, bus stop, subway station, ...

Information Meaningful with a Database

Ari Juels's Famous Picture



Credit: Inspired by Ari Juels

Information Meaningful with a Database

ABIEC Information Leakage

The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window with the address bar displaying `http://www.abiec-bvirh.be/`. The browser's menu bar includes File, Edit, View, History, Bookmarks, Tools, and Help. The address bar contains a search engine icon and the text "Google". Below the address bar, there are several bookmark folders: SUSE Linux, Entertainment, News, Internet Search, Reference, Maps and Directions, Shopping, and People and Compan... The main content area of the browser displays the ABIEC-BVIRH website. The website has a dark blue background with a lighter blue horizontal band at the top. In the top left of this band, there is text in French and Dutch: "Association belge d'identification & d'enregistrement canins / asbl" and "Belgische vereniging voor identificatie & registratie van honden / vzw". To the right of this text is a logo featuring a black silhouette of a dog inside a magnifying glass, with the text "ABIEC-BVIRH" below it. The background of the website is decorated with several white stars, similar to the European Union flag. At the bottom of the website, there are four language selection buttons: NL, FR, DE, and EN, each with a small globe icon. The browser's search bar at the bottom contains the word "social". Below the search bar, there are several search options: Next, Previous, Highlight all, Match case, and Reached end of page, continued from top. The browser's status bar at the very bottom shows the word "Done".

PRIVACY: MALICIOUS TRACEABILITY

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Privacy: Malicious Traceability

Informal Definition

- An adversary should not be able to track a tag holder, ie. he should not be able to **link two interactions tag/reader**.
- **Eg.** tracking of employees by the boss, tracking of children in an amusement park, tracking of military troops, etc.


Privacy: Malicious Traceability

Tracking through the Layers

- The main concepts of cryptography, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and authentication, are treated **without any practical considerations**.
- If one of these properties is theoretically ensured, it remains ensured in practice whatever the layer we choose to implement the protocol.
- Privacy needs to be **ensured at each layer**: All efforts to prevent traceability in the application layer may be useless if no care is taken at the lower layers.

Privacy: Malicious Traceability

Traceability Through the Layers




- Authentication / Identification.
- Collision-avoidance.
- Radio fingerprints.
- Diversity of standards.

Privacy: Malicious Traceability

Application Layer

Reader (list of keys)

Tag (key k)



- This protocol is **not privacy-friendly** because the ID is revealed.
- CR protocols avoiding malicious traceability **do not scale well**.
 - Authenticating one tag requires $O(n)$ operations.

Privacy: Malicious Traceability

Summary

- In the **physical** layer.
 - Hard to avoid malicious traceability, but tracking one tag is far from being easy in practice.
- In the **communication** layer.
 - Malicious traceability is usually do-able in practice.
 - Can be avoided if a cryptographically-secure PRNG is used.
- In the **application** layer.
 - Malicious traceability can be avoided but challenge-response protocols do not scale well.

IS PRIVACY A RESEARCH CHALLENGE?

- Background about RFID
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- There are clearly privacy issues in RFID systems
- Is **privacy** still a meaningful concept nowadays?
- We already lost the control of our privacy.
- People no longer care about privacy (vote...)
- There is no business model behind privacy.
- We could have privacy if it was free.
- Privacy never comes for free.
- All existing works on RFID privacy are **practically** useless.
- Consider privacy with a larger view.
- Do not try to get the best.
- Find some metrics to privacy.
- Enforce privacy using **certifications**.

Conclusion Going Further



[http://sites.uclouvain.be/security/
gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be](http://sites.uclouvain.be/security/gildas.avoine@uclouvain.be)