

PHILIPS

sense **and** simplicity

A quantitative analysis of indistinguishability for a continuous source biometric cryptosystem

I. Buhan-Dulman, J. Breebaart, Jorge Guajardo, K. Groet, E. Kelkboom, T. Akkermans

DPM workshop – *Saint Malo* - September 2009

OVERVIEW

- Biometric authentication system;
- Authentication with protected templates
- QIM fuzzy embedder;
- Cross-matching scenario;
- Classification function used by the adversary;
- Quantitative measures for indistinguishability:
 - advantage of an adversary
 - cross-matching fingerprints from MCYT fingerprint database


- Conclusions

MOTIVATION

- Biometrics is CONVENIENT method for authentication
- LINKED to a person;
- APPLICATIONS:
 - Border control (passport, visa, ID, drivers license)
 - Crime prevention (social security fraud)
 - Ticketing applications
 - Payment systems
 - Access control
 - Forensics
 - Watch lists

PHILIPS

TRADITIONAL BIOMETRIC SYSTEM




TEMPLATE PROTECTION

- WHY:
 1. Identity theft;
 2. Cross matching;
 3. Not renewable;
 4. Reveal medical information;
 5. Legislation;

- A TEMPLATE PROTECTION SYSTEM:
 1. Protects the stored reference information (the template)
 2. Performs authentication is protected domain
 3. A system that gives the state of the art performance;

FUZZY SKETCH


A theoretical TEMPLATE PROTECTION SYSTEM:







- Transforms noisy, non-uniform data into reproducible, uniform binary sequences;
- Their properties are well understood

PHILIPS

BIOMETRIC TEMPLATE PROTECTION SYSTEM



QIM FUZZY EMBEDDER




$$P_1 = Q_{K_1}(X_1) - X_1$$

$$K_1 = \arg \min \left(\left\lfloor \frac{2(X_1 + P_1)}{q} \right\rfloor \frac{q}{2} \right)$$

TYPICAL SCENARIO- simple case (no noise)

TEMPLATE PROTECTION 1



TEMPLATE PROTECTION 2

CASE 1: same subject –no noise is present

TEMPLATE PROTECTION 1


$$P_1 = Q_{K_1}(X_1) - X_1$$

P_1



Storage

P_1



$$P_1 - P_2 \in \left\{0, \pm \frac{q}{2}\right\}$$

Same subject?

YES

P_2



Storage

P_2

TEMPLATE PROTECTION 2

$$P_2 = Q_{K_2}(X_1) - X_1$$

CASE 2: different subjects

TEMPLATE PROTECTION 1

$$P_1 = Q_{K_1}(X) - X$$

P_1



P_1

$$P_1 - P_2 \notin \left\{0, \frac{q}{2}\right\}$$

Same subject?

NO

P_2

P_2



TEMPLATE PROTECTION 2

$$P_2 = Q_{K_2}(Y) - Y$$

CASE 1: same subject

TEMPLATE PROTECTION 1

$$P_1 = Q_{K_1}(X_1) - X_1$$

P_1



P_1

$$P_1 - P_2 \in \left\{ 0, \pm \left(\frac{q}{2} + \delta \right) \right\}$$

Same subject?

YES

P_2




P_2

TEMPLATE PROTECTION 2

$$P_2 = Q_{K_2}(X_1) - (X_1 + \delta)$$

DECISION FUNCTION –in the presence of noise

$$P_1 - P_2 \in \left\{ 0, \pm \left(\frac{q}{2} + \delta \right) \right\}$$



1. INDISTINGUISHABILITY GAME


CHALLENGER

ADVERSARY

1. CHOSE: X, K

2. COMPUTE: $P = Embed(X, K)$

3. SEND




4. FLIP COIN $b \in \{0,1\}$

IF $b = 0$ $P^* = Embed(X', K^*)$

ELSE $P^* = Embed(Y, K^*)$

5. SEND




6. OUTPUT b^*

$$Adv_{IND} = \left| \Pr[b^* = b] - \frac{1}{2} \right|$$


ADVANTAGE OF AN ADVERSARY

$$1 - \Pr[b^* = b]$$



$$0 < \delta < \frac{q}{4}$$

$$Adv_{IND}$$




$$0 < \delta < \frac{q}{4}$$

CHARACTERISTICS

- 323 persons
- 12 fingerprints per person (1 finger)
- processing of fingerprint:
 - squared directional fields
 - Gabor response of fingerprint => 1536 components
- PCA and LDA reduction =(200, 150, 100, 50 features)
- 80% used for training



RELIABILITY QIM (4:1)




WHERE

$$(1) \mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)$$

$$(2) d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') < \frac{q}{2}$$

	m=200	m=150	m=100	m=50
q=1	9.0	8.03	7.05	5.63
q=1.5	4.5	4.59	4.29	3.91
q=2	4.71	4.50	4.10	3.89
q=2.5	5.01	4.45	4.26	4.19
q=3	5.50	5.05	4.85	4.89
q=3.5	5.50	5.38	5.13	2.73

CORRELATION QIM (4:4)



WHERE

$$(1) \mathbf{x} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_m)$$


$$(2) d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}') < \frac{q}{2}$$

	m=200	m=150	m=100	m=50
q=1	28.40	25.81	22.56	19.11
q=1.5	12.30	10.17	8.74	6.90
q=2	5.03	4.08	3.42	1.15
q=2.5	2.89	2.40	2.14	2.35
q=3	2.24	1.95	1.74	2.16
q=3.5	1.86	1.58	1.68	2.16

PHILIPS

CORRELATION QIM ($q=1, M=200$)


EER=28.40%



PHILIPS

CORRELATION QIM ($q=2, m=200$)


$EER=5.03\%$



PHILIPS

CORRELATION QIM ($q=1, m=200$)

EER=2.24%



CONCLUSIONS

- We show that it is possible to correlate protected biometric information;
- Give two measures for indistinguishability;
- The first measures *how far from ideal* the biometric cryptosystem is;
- The second measures *how much we gain* in privacy when protecting the biometric templates;

